Global demographic change : economic impacts and policy challenges : overview panel by Nancy Birdsall
I am afraid I am going to take us back away from central bank
issues, possibly in a fashion too dramatic for many people here.
I assumed when I was asked to speak at a closing session that what
would be appropriate would be an elegant summary with some
thoughtful, new insights. But for two reasons I decided not to do
that. One is that I felt wholly inadequate to the task, particularly in
this community, being myself no expert on the issues with which the
central banking community typically grapples. Second, I wanted to
exploit the opportunity to bring you the perspective of a develop-
ment economist concerned with poverty and inequality in the
poorest countries in the world. I come from an institution that
assesses the implications of the global system and of rich-country
policies on the prospects for sustained economic growth in the devel-
oping world. So, today I want to consider some implications of aging
in the advanced economies, and the policy responses aging is likely
to provoke in the United States and other advanced economies, on
the poorest countries.
I will focus on one particular risk to the poorest countries, namely
the increasing loss of people with exceptional talent and skills—due
to the combined pressures of the worldwide aging phenomenon and
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455the increasingly global nature of the labor market in highly skilled
people. I’ll explain the risk in two parts: First that the past trend of
divergence in per capita income between rich and poor countries
implies a growing global imbalance between where the world’s
workers are and where the world’s wealth and productive capacity is;
and, second, that that imbalance will exacerbate from both the
demand and supply sides the tendency for emigration from poor
countries of skilled people, with potentially high costs to those coun-
tries’ own growth prospects.
Lant Pritchett labeled as “divergence big time” the growing gap in
average per capita income levels between the world’s richest and
poorest countries. The ratio of average income of the five richest
countries in the world in 1900 to the five or 10 poorest countries in
the world then was about 9 to1 in purchasing power parity terms. By
1960, it was 30 to 1, and it is now an estimated 100 to 1. The main
reason for increasing divergence is that a large number of countries
that were poor in 1960 have grown much more slowly or have hardly
grown at all in per capita terms. They are concentrated in sub-
Saharan Africa and south and central Asia.
Of course, it is not true that all countries that were poor in 1960
have failed to grow. Stan Fischer has made the point, as have others,
that at the global level with rapid growth in China and India, both of
which are still today classified as “low-income” by the World Bank,
global inequality measured across people is coming down. I am
making a different point, which is not inconsistent, namely that there
are a large number of very poor countries, whose populations total
almost 1 billion and are still growing rapidly, where economic growth
is barely keeping up with population growth. Between them and the
richest countries, there is not convergence.
Lack of convergence is perfectly consistent with economic model-
ing of the notion of “conditional” convergence—that is, convergence
as long as poorer countries have adequate economic management
policies, healthy institutions, and a minimum level of human capital,
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property rights, rule of law, and so on. Recent economic analyses of
the determinants of economic growth in the developing world
suggest that these “conditions” that seem to be prerequisites of growth
do not exist and are difficult to “produce” in many of the currently
poorest countries. Even good economic policy, though no doubt
necessary, seems far from sufficient to ensure growth. In many low-
income countries, especially in Africa but elsewhere as well, a decade
of reasonably sound macroeconomic policy under the tutelage of the
IMF has not triggered the rapid growth that China and India now
enjoy. These tend to be countries with some lethal combination of
poor access to global markets and other geographic handicaps, high
disease burdens, heavy dependence on primary commodity exports,
high debt levels, and/or a history of internal conflict, corruption,
political instability, and neighboring country difficulties—which
combined with initial low household income inhibit private savings
and investment.
A fundamental constraint in countries that have failed at growth
seems to be the weakness of political and economic institutions that
provide the ballast for healthy growth, and in a vicious circle, the
difficulty of creating and sustaining such institutions in settings that
start with certain handicaps. Table 1 shows the close association
(though not necessarily the causality I have suggested) between
average country income and some widely used and reasonably good
summary measures of institutional capacity, which reflect such indi-
cators as enforcement of property rights, level of corruption,
economic management and so on.
What does continuing divergence of incomes imply for the future,
taking into account demographic change in different settings as well
as possible paths of income growth? Chart 1 shows for various
country groups per capita income and size of working-age popula-
tions in 2050 compared to 2000, assuming average total income
growth over the 50-year period for the different groups is the sum of
the projected average annual growth of their working-age populations
over the period (a far more certain projection than that for economicgrowth) and a productivity factor. The latter (set out in detail in the
notes to the chart) is assumed to be an annual 1 percent for low-
income countries, and 1.7 and 1.4 percent respectively for the United
States and other OECD countries. Thus, the assumption of diver-
gence is built in (though divergence is less than it would be since in
the low-income countries the growth of the working-age population
relative to total population is much faster than in any other group).
Under these assumptions, income per capita in the advanced
economies would be in the range of $40,000 to $70,000 in 2050,
compared with about $650 per capita in today’s low-income coun-
tries. The ratio of income would still be about 100 to 1, but, of
course, in absolute terms the difference would be much larger—
which could matter for some so-called positional goods in global
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Table 1
Measures of Institutional Performance/Quality in 2000 and
2050 by Country/Group
Institutional measures
KKZ index1 ICRG index2
(a higher score indicates better performance)
2000 2000
USA 1.4 82
Other OECD3 1.5 83
China -0.3 74
India -0.2 62
Middle income -0.1 68
Low income -0.8 56 
Notes: 
1The KKZ index ranges from -2.5 to +2.5 where a higher score indicates better governance outcomes.
The index shown here is the group average of six equally weighted components, voice-accountability,
political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. 
2The ICRG index is based on 22 risk components and ranges from 0-100 where 0=highest risk and
100=lowest risk.
3Other OECD excludes the U.S., Mexico, and Korea.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau International Database; Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (2002)
"Governance Matters II: Updated Indicators for 2000-2001;" World Bank Policy Research Depart-
ment Working Paper 2772; World Development Indicators 2004; and PRS Group monthly









































































Notes: *Other OECD excludes the U.S., Mexico, and Korea. The total, average GDP growth rates for
2000-2050 used to obtain 2050 GDP projections for other OECD, the U.S., low-income countries are
based on growth of working-age population plus rough guess at productivity growth, biased toward total
GDP growth in round numbers. Total average, real GDP growth rates 2000-2050 for China, India, and
middle-income countries (Brazil) are from Goldman Sachs (2003) and allow for real exchange rate
appreciation over the period. The assumed total GDP growth rates 2000-2050 are 1 percent, 2.3
percent, 4.9 percent, 5.8 percent, 3.7 percent, 3 percent respectively for other OECD, the U.S., China,
India, middle income, and low-income countries. The group definitions follow countries’ income clas-
sification in 2000 and the working-age population is defined as 15-64-year-olds.
Source: World Development Indicators 2004, U.S. Census Bureau International Database, Goldman
Sachs (2003) and author's calculations
Chart 1
Per Capita GDP in 2000 amd 2050 by Country/Group
(Current U.S. Dollars)
Working-Age Population in 2000 and 2050 by Country/Group
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markets, and would obviously matter for the already globalized
market for certain kinds of skilled labor.
Chart 2 illustrates the outcome of these projections and assump-
tions in terms of population and income shares in 2000 and 2050.
We now have in the United States and the OECD 80 percent of
world income and 15 percent of world population, a ratio of more
than 5 to 1. Low-income countries, excluding China and India, now
have 1 percent of world income and almost 20 percent of world
population, a ratio of about 0.05 to 1—100 times smaller. In 2050
they could have almost 30 percent of the world’s population and just
2 percent of world income.
By 2050 the rich countries will have much of the world’s wealth but
dramatically few of the world’s workers. In 2050 the United States
and the other OECD countries, excluding Mexico and Korea, will
have about 550 million people of working age and all the low- and
middle-income countries, including China and India, more than 4.5
billion. The slower-growing low-income countries alone, excluding
China and India, will have about 1.6 billion people of working age.
Over that period, everywhere except in those low-income countries
and in India there will be declines in the shares of the working-age
group in total populations, and everywhere including in the poorest
countries there will have been at least a doubling of the shares of
populations over 65. 
In short, wage and income differences between the richest and
poorest countries (and indeed as Chart 1 suggests between the richest
and all the other country groups) will be greater than they are today
and will be combined with fiscal and other pressures associated with
“aging” everywhere generating considerable demands for movement
of workers from poorer to richer countries. Wealth and productivity
will be concentrated in one set of countries, and to a large extent, the
world’s worker in another set. Indeed, cross-country economic analy-
sis suggests as association between country level measures of


























Shares of World Population in 2000 
(Percent)
Shares of World Population in 2050
(Percent, projected)
Notes: *Other OECD excludes the U.S., Mexico, and Korea. The group definitions follow countries’
income classification in 2000. For example, the countries included in the low-income group were clas-
sified as low income in 2000 (per capita GDP of less than US$765 in 2000).


























Shares of World GDP in 2000
(Percent)
Shares of World GDP in 2050
(Percent, projected)
Notes: *Other OECD excludes the U.S., Mexico, and Korea. The total, average GDP growth rates for
2000-2050 used to obtain 2050 GDP projections for other OECD, the U.S., low-income countries and
low-income sub-Saharan Africa are based on growth of working-age population plus rough guess at
productivity growth, biased toward total GDP growth in round numbers. Total average, real GDP
growth rates 2000-2050 for China, India, and middle-income countries (Brazil) are from Goldman
Sachs (2003) and allow for real exchange rate appreciation over the period. The assumed total GDP
growth rates 2000-2050 are 1 percent, 2.3 percent, 4.9 percent, 5.8 percent, 3.7 percent, 3 percent
respectively for other OECD, the U.S., China, India, middle-income, and low-income countries. The
group definitions follow countries' income classification in 2000.
Source: World Development Indicators 2004, U.S. Census Bureau International Database, Goldman
Sachs (2003), and author's calculations Overview 463
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Chart 3
Share of Labor Force Age 40-49 by Region/Country 
over the Period 1950-2050 (Percent)
Notes: The labor force is defined as 15-64 years old. The numbers are projections from
2002 onward. 
Source: United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revi-
sion Population Database
drives home the point about future likely imbalances in productivity
related to demographic shifts—except in China, the share of the total
working-age population age 40 to 49 will remain smaller for the next
half-century everywhere than it is today in the OECD economies.
Let me go to the second part of the argument. What are the impli-
cations of rich-country aging combined with these imbalances for
future trends in the international mobility of skilled workers? It is fair
to assume that the pressures associated with aging will lead OECD
countries to reinforce current immigration policies that already are
designed to attract skilled workers. General equilibrium models of the
potential for immigration to relieve the fiscal and other pressures of
aging in the advanced economies suggest minimal benefit from
greater immigration of unskilled workers (for example, Kotlikoff and
others), and/or measurable benefits only with increases in rates of
immigration that are unlikely to be politically acceptable. On the
other hand, that is not the case for skilled workers (whose lifetime tax
payments are likely to exceed their lifetime fiscal “costs”).464 Nancy Birdsall
Chart 4 shows that, in fact, there is an increasing trend in issuance
by the United States of the special H-1 visas granted skilled foreign
workers. Not surprisingly, given not only large wage differences across
countries but the greater specialization (scale and agglomeration
economies) and intangible benefits of working in a more competitive
and productive environment, the demand is easily met by an
adequate supply. In fact, the supply is assuredly much greater than the
legally constrained “demand.” Table 2 provides a comparison of the
proportion of U.S. immigrants from various countries with tertiary
education, relative to the proportions of people in their sending
countries with tertiary education. Consider the (extreme) case of
Nigeria. Eighty-three percent of Nigerians in the United States have
tertiary education, compared with 4 percent of Nigerians in Nigeria.
Table 3 shows that for almost all developing countries, rates of
emigration of skilled workers are increasing. The best-known example
is the increasing trend of emigration of nurses from English-speaking
Africa, even as that continent suffers the AIDS pandemic; the result-
















































Total H-1 Visas Issued and Number of H-1 Visas Issued to 
Developed and Developing Countries, 1989-1999
Note: The developing country group includes India, China, the Philippines, Mexico, and Russia.
Source: Lowell (2000) "H-1B Temporary Workers: Estimating the Population," CCIS Working
Paper 12, Washington, D.C.: The Center for Comparative Immigration StudiesOverview 465
Table 2
Share of Foreign-Born Population with Tertiary Education 
in the U.S. and Share of Source Country Population 
with Tertiary Education in 2000






El Salvador 17 17
















Sri Lanka 72 5
Sudan 63 7
Tunisia 64 21
Notes: Numbers are for population age 25 years and over. Tertiary education corresponds to more
than 12 years of schooling.
Source: Kapur and McHale (forthcoming), Sharing the Spoils: International Human Capital Flows and
Developing Countries, Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development, who cite Census 2000,
U.S. Census Bureau, Adams (2003), and World Development Indicators 2004the “poaching” of nurses (with signing bonuses and so on) for their
public sector health services (though this has not halted the recruit-
ment by private health services).
Why does this matter for these poor countries? There are potential-
benefits—remittances and the possibility of return migration with
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Table 3
Absent Human Capital 
Emigration Rates to the U.S. for High-Skilled Workers 
25 and Older in 1990 and 20001
Percent of 
domestic population
(source country) Change (percent)
Country of birth 1990 2000 1990-2000
Mexico 10.3 14.2 38
Philippines 6.6 10.5 59
India 1.1 2.7 145
China 1.4 2.2 57
El Salvador 26.1 28.3 8
Dominican Republic 14.2 19.9 40
Jamaica 67.5 78.6 16
Colombia 5.6 9.0 61
Guatemala 13.5 20.5 52
Peru 3.0 4.0 33
Pakistan 2.4 6.0 150
Brazil 0.6 1.1 83
Egypt 2.5 2.2 -12
Bangladesh 0.6 2.2 267
Turkey 1.5 1.3 -13
Indonesia 1.4 0.7 -50
Sri Lanka 3.8 5.3 39
Sudan 1.8 3.3 83
Tunisia 1.6 1.3 -19
1High-skilled workers are defined as those with tertiary education. The emigration rate is computed
as the number of tertiary emigrants divided by the sum of tertiary emigrants and workers in the source
country with tertiary education.
Source: Kapur and McHale (forthcoming), Sharing the Spoils: International Human Capital Flows and
Developing Countries, Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development, who cite Carrington and
Detragiache (1998) for 1990 numbers and Adams (2003) for 2000 numbersenriched human capital and return investments by emigrants. But
there are also high costs. In addition to the fiscal losses associated with
the sending countries’ (often publicly financed) investment in these
emigrants’ education, and the loss of a critical input to growth,
human capital, there is a less tangible but potentially critical loss to
the low-income countries. That is the lost positive externalities—the
spillover effects—that are critical to building the local institutions
that are in turn so central to sustained economic growth. If we believe
that initial stages of institution-building require a critical mass of
innovative, skilled people, then countries like Nigeria can ill afford
this loss.
Rates of emigration of unskilled workers are also bound to increase
as wage differences continue to grow and given employer demands in
the more rapidly aging economies. But because the population base
from which such workers come in the poorest countries is so huge,
and the political tolerance for their entry into the rich countries is
ultimately limited, any positive effect on wage levels and other
economic variables in the sending countries will be marginal.
What about remittances? Table 4 shows the use of remittances by
Bangladeshi households. It is not obvious that remittance income is
used differently by poor households than is their non-remittance
income. Relatively little goes to productive investment or to savings
that are likely to be intermediated. A more fundamental problem is
that in countries where there is not much incentive to invest—
whether because of poor policies, lack of property rights, or political
instability, remittances are not likely to affect growth trajectories
(though they certainly do increase recipients’ welfare). 
Is there any policy implication at all? None of what I have set out
is meant to suggest that restricting the mobility of people—either by
sending or receiving countries—would be a good thing to do at the
global level (though it is notable that we are much quicker to see the
violation of individual rights in restricting emigration than in restrict-
ing immigration). From a narrow economic point of view, and in
Overview 467terms of rights defined solely at the individual level, it is full liberal-
ization of the global labor market that would be ideal. Nor do I mean
to suggest that reducing emigration of skilled people from poor coun-
tries would solve those countries’ growth problems. Indeed, the
additional burden on currently poor countries that is likely to arise
because of aging-induced immigration policy in the rich countries
will be small compared with the shortcomings associated with their
own weak policy and institutional problems. The fate of those coun-
tries is, in the end, mostly in their own hands. 
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Table 4
Bangladesh: Use of Remittances Sent from Abroad 1998-2000
Use Share of total remittances (percent)
Food and clothes 20.45
Home construction/repair 15.02
Agricultural land purchase 11.24
Repayment of loan (for migration) 10.55
Social ceremonies 9.07
Sending family member abroad 7.19
Investment in business 4.76




Release of mortgaged land 2.24
Taking out a mortgage to purchase land 1.99
Other 1.14
Homestead land purchase 0.96
Gift/donations to relatives 0.94




Note: Study based on interviews with 100 households in two villages, Tangail and Chittagong.
Source: Abrar and Siddiqui (2003), "Migrant Worker Remittances and Micro-Finance in
Bangladesh," Working Paper 38, Social Finance Program, International Labor OrganizationOn the other hand, it is also true that if rich countries were to liber-
alize their markets in this domain, as they have in goods, services, and
capital, many more millions of people would leave poor countries and
human welfare at the global level would probably be greater—even
taking into account the disruption to communities and losses of well-
being broadly conceived to which John Helliwell refers so well. And
some of the low-income countries might have some greater probabil-
ity of accumulating and retaining the critical mass of skills that could
trigger a growth spurt that might then be sustained. 
Still, between ignoring the dilemma at the global level and the
impractical ideal, there are, in fact, reasonable steps the increasingly
richer (and older) receiving countries can take to minimize the risks
to their poorer neighbors. These include compensation through bilat-
eral agreements for sharing of tax revenues; policies to encourage
temporary return to their home countries of skilled workers without
loss of residency rights, so as to encourage greater return investments;
increases in temporary immigration of both skilled and unskilled;
and, as mentioned by David Canning, other arrangements that
would shift the global community from quantitative restrictions to
less distortionary “pricing,” analogous to the shift from quotas to
tariffs in trade regimes.
I realize even these proposals amount to a call for unusually enlight-
ened, far-sighted, and some would say impossibly altruistic policy
decisions in the United States and the other advanced economies. I
regret adding my own policy pessimism to that of the last couple of
days here, regarding the possibility of the kinds of reforms that would
ease adjustments to aging—by in this case suggesting that one possi-
ble adjustment mechanism for the better-off countries, greater
immigration of skilled people, may have its own costs for the worse-
off countries and more generally at the global level (assuming we all
care in some measure about a divided unequal world).
So instead, let me end on a happy note. Let me predict that a decade
hence, the next time the Kansas City Federal Reserve Bank addresses
the global implications of some phenomenon, you will be welcoming
Overview 469some central bankers from such places as Tajikistan, Malawi, Cambo-
dia, and Senegal, as well as from India, Turkey, and Brazil, to the
non-pecuniary benefits of engagement (which John Helliwell also
described so well) into this banking community. That will be a healthy
step toward a better as well as a more globalized world. 
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